

**2021
DESKTOP LEGAL
PRIMER FOR
OHIO CLAIMS**



Licking County Courthouse, Newark, Ohio, Photo by David L. Dingwell

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I. CLAIM LIMITATION PERIODS

A. Statutes of Limitation

1 Year

- Actions for libel, slander, malicious prosecution or false imprisonment – one year after the cause of action accrues. O.R.C. §2305.11(A).
- Assault and battery. O.R.C. §2305.111(B).
- Contribution claims can be brought within one year after judgment has become final by lapse of time for appeal or after appellate review. O.R.C. §2307.26.
- Legal malpractice (with discovery rule). O.R.C. §2305.11(A).
- Loss of consortium arising from medical malpractice. O.R.C. §2305.113.

2 Years

- Bodily injury, including common law dog bite claims. O.R.C. §2305.10(A).
- Wrongful death. O.R.C. §2125.02(D)(1).
- Injury to personal property. O.R.C. §2305.10(A).
- Product liability. O.R.C. §2305.10(A). Subject to product liability statute of repose.
- Employer intentional tort. O.R.C. §2305.10(A); *Funk v. Rent-All Mart, Inc.*, 2001-Ohio-270, 91 Ohio St.3d 78, 81, 742 N.E.2d 127, 129-30.

3 Years

- The SMART Act imposes a statute of limitations on Medicare filing suit over an unpaid lien. It has three years from the date it receives notice that the plaintiff's case has settled. (Applies to all suits settled after July 10, 2013). 42 U.S.C. §1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii).

4 Years

- Fraud. O.R.C. §2305.09(C). Except five years for identity theft.
- Invasion of privacy. O.R.C. §2305.09(D).
- Trespass upon real property. O.R.C. §2305.09(A).
- Breach of contract for the sale of goods. O.R.C. §1302.98(A). Parties to the sale may agree on a different limitations period of no more than four but as little as one year.
- General negligence, where there is no specific statutory statute of limitation. O.R.C. §2305.09(D).
- For the recovery of personal property or for taking or detaining it. O.R.C. §2305.09(B).
- Tort actions for damage to real property. O.R.C. §2305.09(D).
- Breach of fiduciary duty. O.R.C. §2305.09; *Cundall v. U.S. Bank*, 122 Ohio St.3d 188, 2009-Ohio-2523.
- Conversion. O.R.C. §2305.09(B).
- Claim of bad faith against an insurer. O.R.C. §2305.09(D); *United Dept. Stores Co. No. 1 v. Continental Cas. Co.*, 41 Ohio App.3d 72, 73 (1st Dist. 1987).
- Loss of consortium for non-medical malpractice claims. O.R.C. §2305.09(D).
- Intentional infliction of emotional distress, unless the emotional distress is "parasitic" to another tort. O.R.C. §2305.09; *Yeager v. Local Union 20*, 6 Ohio St.3d 369, 375 (1983). *Manin v. Diloreti*, 94 Ohio App.3d 777, 641 N.E.2d 826 (9th Dist. 1994).
- Claims for tortious interference with business and tortious interference with contract. O.R.C. §2305.09(D).

6 Years

- Oral contract. O.R.C. §2305.07.
- Statutory dog bite claims. O.R.C. §2305.07; *Bora v. Kerchelich*, 2 Ohio St.3d 146 (1983).
- Implied contract to indemnify. O.R.C. §2305.07; *Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co.*, 502 F.2d 138, 141 (6th Cir. 1974).
- Unjust enrichment. O.R.C. §2305.07; *Hambleton v. R.G. Barry Corp.*, 12 Ohio St.3d 179 (1984).
- Claim by a statutory subrogee to recover workers' compensation benefits. O.R.C. §2305.07; *Ohio Bureau of Workers' Comp. v. McKinley*, 130 Ohio St.3d 156, 2011-Ohio-4432.
- An action to enforce a note payable at a definite time must be brought within six years of the date due or, if accelerated, within six years of the date of acceleration. O.R.C. §1303.16(A).
- An action to enforce a note payable on demand must be brought within six years of the demand date, but if no demand is made, an action to enforce the note is barred if neither principal nor interest on the note has been paid for a continuous period of ten years. O.R.C. §1303.16(B).

8 Years

- Written contract. O.R.C. §2305.06. For causes of action governed by O.R.C. §2305.06 and that accrued prior to Sept. 28, 2012, the period of limitations shall be eight years from Sept. 28, 2012, or the expiration of the 15-year period of limitations in effect prior to Sept. 28, 2012, whichever occurs first. S.B. 224, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2011 Ohio SB 224 (Ohio 2011). Generally, in the absence of a controlling statute to the contrary, a provision in a contract may validly limit, as between the parties, the time for bringing an action on such contract to a period less than that prescribed in a general statute of limitations provided that the shorter period shall be a reasonable one. *Shafer v. Russ Newman Ins. Agency*, 2013-Ohio-885 (4th Dist. 2013).

12 Years

- Childhood sexual abuse. O.R.C. §2305.111(C). Starts to run when child turns 18.

21 Years

- An action to recover the title to or possession of real property shall be brought within 21 years after the cause of action accrued. O.R.C. §2305.04.

Claims Against an Estate – All claims against an estate, including claims arising out of contract, tort, cognovit notes, or on judgments, whether due or not due, secured or unsecured, liquidated or unliquidated, shall be presented within six months after the death of the decedent, whether or not the estate is released from administration or an executor or administrator is appointed during that six-month

period. O.R.C. §2117.06(B). If a claim is contingent at the time of a decedent's death and a cause of action subsequently accrues on the claim, it shall be presented to the executor or administrator in the same manner as other claims before the expiration of six months after the date of death of the decedent, or before the expiration of two months after the cause of action accrues, whichever is later. The executor or administrator shall allow or reject the claim in the same manner as other claims are allowed or rejected. If the claim is allowed, the executor or administrator shall proceed to pay it. If the claim is rejected, the claimant shall commence an action on the claim within two months after the rejection or be forever barred from maintaining an action on the claim. O.R.C. §2117.37.

Medical Malpractice – One year after the cause of action accrued. O.R.C. §2305.113(A). No action shall be commenced more than four years after the occurrence of the act or omission. O.R.C. §2305.113(C)(1) and (2). If a person could not have reasonably discovered the medical malpractice within three years of it happening, but discovers the malpractice before the end of four years after it occurred, the person may commence an action not later than one year after the person discovers the injury. O.R.C. §2305.113(D)(1). A person may bring an action over a foreign object left in the body of a person within one year after the person discovers it or should have discovered it. O.R.C. §2305.113(D)(2).

Tolling – Statutes of limitation may be suspended or tolled for minors or for those of unsound mind. O.R.C. §2305.16. But tolling does not affect contractual limitation of action provisions. *Sarmiento v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co.*, 106 Ohio St.3d 403 (2005).

B. Product Liability Statute of Repose

- Ohio has a ten-year statute of repose for product liability claims. No product liability claim shall accrue against the manufacturer or supplier of a product later than ten years from the date the product was delivered to its first purchaser or first lessee. O.R.C. §2305.10(C)(1).
- The statute of repose does not apply to asbestos claims, to claims from exposure to hazardous or toxic chemicals, to drugs or medical devices, or if the manufacturer warranted the product for longer than ten years, or if the manufacturer engaged in fraud in regard to information about the product and if the fraud contributed to the alleged harm. O.R.C. §2305.10(C)(2)–(7).

C. Construction Statute of Repose

- Ohio imposes a ten-year statute of repose barring any cause of action to recover damages for bodily injury, injury to real or personal property, or wrongful death arising out of a defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property against a person who performed services for the improvement to real property later than ten years from the date of substantial completion of the improvement. O.R.C. §2305.131.
- The Ohio Supreme Court has recently clarified that the statute's bar applies to any civil cause of action meeting its statutory criteria, regardless of sounding in tort or breach of contract. *New Riegel Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Buehrer Group Architecture & Eng., Inc.*, 157 Ohio St.3d 164 (2019).
 - The statute includes certain exceptions. For example, the statute does not bar claims for breach of express warranty where the warranty guarantees the work for a period longer than the ten-year repose period [O.R.C. §2305.131(D)], does not apply to improvements in which the party providing services engaged in fraudulent conduct [O.R.C. §2305.131(C)], and does not bar causes of action against the owner, tenant, landlord, or other person in possession or control of the improvement to real property at issue.

D. Employment Discrimination Claims Under O.R.C. §4112

- An employment discrimination claimant must first exhaust all administrative remedies at the Ohio Civil Rights Commission prior to filing a lawsuit. Claimant must file a charge with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission within **two years**.
- As amended in January 2021, and effective April 15, 2021, a person who files a civil action in Common Pleas Court alleging employment discrimination must file within **two years** of the unlawful discriminatory practice, per O.R.C. §§4112.052(C)(1) and 4112.14E(1).
- The time period to file a civil action is tolled for the period of time the charge is pending with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, O.R.C. §§4112.052(C)(1) and 4112.14E(2).
- EEOC Charge for federal employment discrimination claims must be filed: **180 days, or 300 days** (if plaintiff initially instituted proceedings with an authorized state agency).
- 42 U.S.C. §2000e Title VII Claim: **within 90 days** of receipt of "Right to Sue" letter from EEOC.
- ADA Claim: **within 90 days** of receipt of "Right to Sue" letter from EEOC.

E. Employment Law Claims

ERISA

- **8 years** per O.R.C. §2305.06 (generally, may vary depending on type of claim); See *Meade v. Pension Appeals & Review Committee*, 966 F.2d 190, 195 (6th Cir. 1992); (because ERISA provides no statute of limitations for claims for benefits under 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(1)(B), the court should apply the most analogous state law statute of limitations, which is breach of contract in Ohio); *Engleson v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am.*, N.D. Ohio No. 5:09-CV-2969, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187548, at *30 (June 29, 2012) (same).
- However, federal law determines when an ERISA cause of action accrues despite the fact that state law determines the relevant statute of limitation. *Davis v. Bante*, E.D. Mich. No. 07-12270, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99287, at *9-10 (Sep. 12, 2007).

Fair Labor Standards Act (Overtime, Minimum Wage, Equal Pay) – 29 U.S.C. §201, et seq.

- **2 years** (**3 years** for willful violations) per 29 U.S.C. §255.

Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act

- Claims for wage discrimination under O.R.C. §4111.17: **1 year**
- Claims for nonpayment of minimum wage under O.R.C. §4111.02: **2 years** per O.R.C. §2305.11.
- Claims for unpaid overtime compensation under O.R.C. §4111.03: **2 years** per O.R.C. §2305.11.

Workers' Compensation Retaliation

- Claims under Ohio Workers' Compensation Retaliation Statute, O.R.C. §4123.90.
 - Employee has **180 days** from the date of the retaliatory act to file suit; but
 - Employee must also notify employer, in writing, within **90 days** of the retaliatory act.

Whistleblower

- Claims under Ohio Whistleblower Statute, O.R.C. §4113.52: **180 days** (must notify employer orally and then in writing of employer conduct that is either criminal activity or affects safety).

FMLA - 29 U.S.C. §2601, et seq.

- **2 years** (3 years for willful violations) per 29 U.S.C. §2617(c).

"Greeley" Public Policy Claim for Wrongful Discharge

- **4 years** per O.R.C. §2305.09(D). See *Pytlinski v. Brocar Prods.*, 94 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (2002) ("An action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is not specifically covered by any statutory section. Accordingly, we find that the limitations period for common-law claims for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is four years as set forth in R.C. 2305.09(D)").
- However, *Pytlinski* does not eliminate the requirements that a plaintiff must comply with in other statutes, such as the 180-day limitations period contained in O.R.C. §4123.90 or O.R.C. §4113.52. See, e.g., *Thompson v. Gynecologic Oncology & Pelvic Surgery Assocs.*, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 06AP-340, 2006-Ohio-6377; *Lesko v. Riverside Methodist Hosp.*, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-1130, 2005-Ohio-3142; *Shaffer v. OhioHealth Corp.*, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-236, 2004-Ohio-6523.

Uniformed Services Employment and Re-Employment Rights Act, 28 U.S.C. §§4301 to 4335

- No statute of limitations for instituting litigation. See 38 U.S.C. §4327(b); See *Corbin v. Southwest Airlines, Inc.*, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171672 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2018) (Congress amended USERRA to make it clear that there is no state or federal statute of limitations for USERRA claims); *Brill v. AK Steel Corp.*, S.D. Ohio No. 2:09-CV-534, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35251, at *29 (Mar. 14, 2012) (Congress never intended a statute of limitations to apply to USERRA claims); *Ward v. Shelby Cty.*, W.D. Tenn. No. 2:20-cv-02407-JPM, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 219256, at *11-12 (Nov. 19, 2020) ("The USERRA does not impose a statute of limitations on the Plaintiff").
- Note: there are time limitations for requesting re-employment. See 38 U.S.C. §4312.

II. EMPLOYER INTENTIONAL TORT

- An employer shall not be liable unless the plaintiff proves that the employer acted with the intent to injure, or with the belief that the injury was substantially certain to occur.
 - "Substantially certain" means that the employer acts with deliberate intent to cause an employee to suffer an injury, a disease, a condition, or death. *Wentling v. David Motor Coach Ltd.*, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2017CA00190, 2018-Ohio-1618.
 - Deliberate removal of an equipment safety guard, or deliberate misrepresentation of a toxic or hazardous substance, creates a rebuttable presumption that the employer acted with intent to injure. See O.R.C. §2745.01(C); *Stetter v. R.J. Corman Derailment Servs., L.L.C.*, 125 Ohio St.3d 280 (2010); *Kaminski v. Metal & Wire Prods. Co.*, 125 Ohio St.3d 250 (2010); *Houdek v. ThyssenKrupp Materials N.A., Inc.*, 134 Ohio St.3d 491 (2012).
- Free-standing items that serve as physical barriers between the employee and potential exposure to injury, such as rubber gloves and sleeves, are not "an equipment safety guard" for purposes of O.R.C. §2745.01(C). *Hewitt v. L.E. Myers Co.*, 134 Ohio St.3d 199 (2012).
- The failure to provide protective equipment and the failure to adequately train and supervise does not rise to the level of deliberate intent to cause injury required by O.R.C. §2745.01. *McCarthy v. Sterling Chems., Inc.*, 193 Ohio App.3d 164, 2011-Ohio-887, 951 N.E.2d 441 (1st Dist.).
- Alleged deficiencies in training, safety procedures, safety equipment, instructions, or warnings are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to deliberate intent. *Roberts v. RMB Ent., Inc.*, 197 Ohio App.3d 435, 2011-Ohio-6223, 967 N.E.2d 1263 (12th Dist.).
- Absent a deliberate intent to injure another, an employer is not liable for a claim alleging an employer intentional tort, and the injured employee's exclusive remedy is within the workers' compensation system. *Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. DTJ Ents., Inc. (In re Hoyle)*, 143 Ohio St.3d 197, 2015-Ohio-843, 36 N.E.3d 122.

III. DAMAGES

A. Caps on Non-Economic (Pain and Suffering) Damages

1. Tort Claims Other Than for Medical Malpractice

- Ohio has **NO** limits on the amount of compensatory damages that an injured person can recover for economic losses in a tort action.
- Any bodily injury qualifies.
- However, non-economic (pain and suffering) damages are capped in non-medical malpractice tort actions.
 - Those caps do not apply to wrongful death or if the plaintiff has suffered a permanent and substantial physical deformity, loss of use of limb, or loss of a bodily organ system, or permanent physical functional injury that permanently prevents the injured person from being able to independently care for himself/herself and perform life sustaining activities. O.R.C. §2315.18(B)(3)(a) and (b).
- When the non-economic loss compensatory damage caps apply, such non-economic losses are limited to the greater of \$250,000 or three times the economic loss, not to exceed \$350,000 for each plaintiff or a maximum of \$500,000 for each occurrence that is the basis of tort action. O.R.C. §2315.18(B)(2).
- In determining an award of non-economic loss, the trier of fact shall **not** consider evidence: (1) of a defendant's alleged wrongdoing, misconduct or guilt; (2) of the defendant's wealth or financial resources; or (3) offered for the purpose of punishing the defendant. O.R.C. §2315.18(C)(1)-(3).
- The trier of fact is required in its verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories specifying the total compensatory damages and the amount representing economic loss and the amount representing non-economic (pain and suffering) loss. O.R.C. §2315.18(D).
- Any party may seek summary judgment prior to trial with respect to whether the alleged injury falls within or outside the caps on non-economic damages. O.R.C. §2315.18(E)(2).
- A court of common pleas has no jurisdiction to enter a judgment on an award of compensatory damages for non-economic loss (pain and suffering) in excess of the limits set forth above [O.R.C. §2315.18(F)(1)] and neither the court, counsel nor witnesses may inform or instruct the jury or potential jurors about the caps or limits on non-economic (pain and suffering) damages. O.R.C. §2315.18(F)(2).
- In any tort action, except a wrongful death action, against a city, political subdivision or state, the amount of non-economic damages that a party may recover, in a non-death lawsuit, is capped at \$250,000, even if a jury should award damages in excess of that amount. O.R.C. §2744.05(C)(1); *Oliver v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co.*, 123 Ohio St.3d 278, 2009-Ohio-5030.
- Ohio's caps on non-economic damages also apply to defamation claims. *Wayt v. DHSC, L.L.C.*, 2018-Ohio-4822.

2. Medical Malpractice Claims

- In actions for medical, dental, optometric or chiropractic malpractice, the same caps for non-economic (pain and suffering) damages apply: The greater of \$250,000 or three times the economic loss, not to exceed \$350,000, for each plaintiff or \$500,000 per occurrence. O.R.C. §2323.43(A)(2).
 - However, these caps are raised in such malpractice actions to \$500,000 for each plaintiff or \$1 million per occurrence if the non-economic losses for the plaintiff are for either:
 - (a) Permanent and substantial physical deformity, loss of use of a limb, or loss of a bodily organ system;
 - (b) Permanent physical functional injury that permanently prevents the injured person from being able to independently care for self and perform life sustaining activities. O.R.C. §2323.43(A)(3).

B. Caps on Punitive Damages

- Punitive damages must be proven by "clear and convincing evidence." O.R.C. §2315.21(D)(4).
- The punitive damages statute differentiates between two classes of employers, a "small employer" and a "large employer." A "small employer" is one who employs less than 100 people on a full-time basis, or, in the case of a manufacturer, an employer who employs less than 500 full-time employees.
- Punitive damages against "small employers," including individuals, are capped at the lesser of:
 1. Two times the amount of the compensatory damages awarded to the plaintiff from the defendant; or
 2. 10% of the employer's or individual's net worth when the tort was committed, up to a maximum of \$350,000. O.R.C. §2315.21(D)(2)(b).
- For all other employers, punitive damages are limited to not more than two times the amount of compensatory damages. O.R.C. §2315.21(D)(2)(a).
- Punitive damages are not recoverable from a defendant unless the trier of fact has awarded the plaintiff compensatory damages, and the actions or omissions of that defendant demonstrate malice or aggravated or egregious fraud, or that the defendant, as principal or master, knowingly authorized, participated in, or ratified actions or omissions of an agent or servant that so demonstrate. O.R.C. §2315.21(C)(1) and (2). *Niskanen v. Giant Eagle, Inc.*, 122 Ohio St.3d 486, 2009-Ohio-3626.
- Upon motion of any party prior to trial where punitive damages are claimed, the trial court shall bifurcate the compensatory damage part of the trial from the punitive damage part of the trial. O.R.C. §2315.21(B)(1)(a); *Havel v. Villa St. Joseph*, 131 Ohio St.3d 235, 2012-Ohio-552.
- There is a separate statute covering punitive damages in product liability actions. O.R.C. §2307.80.
- Punitive damages are not recoverable from a city, political subdivision or state. O.R.C. §2744.05(A).
- Punitive damages are not recoverable for a wrongful death claim. Ohio's wrongful death statute, O.R.C. §2125.02, only allows for the recovery of compensatory damages in wrongful death actions. *Rubeck v. Huffman*, 54 Ohio St.2d 20, 23 (1978).

C. Damage to Real Property

- When real property has been permanently or irreparably damaged, the measure of damage is the difference in the fair market value of the whole property, including improvements thereon, immediately before and immediately after the damage occurred.
- The fair market value of real property is the price it would bring if offered for sale in the open market by an owner who

wanted to sell it, but was under no necessity to do so, and when purchased by a buyer who wanted to buy it, but was under no necessity or compulsion to do so - both parties being aware of the pertinent facts concerning the property.

- In an action based on temporary injury to noncommercial real estate, a plaintiff need not prove diminution in the market value of the property in order to recover the reasonable costs of restoration, but either party may offer evidence of diminution of the market value of the property as a factor bearing on the reasonableness of the cost of restoration. *Martin v. Design Const.*, 121 Ohio St.3d 66, 2009-Ohio-1; *Ohio Collieries Co. v. Cocke*, 107 Ohio St. 238 (1923).

D. Damage to Personal Property

- The measure of damages to personal property is the difference in the fair market value of the property immediately before and after the damage. *Falter v. Toledo*, 169 Ohio St. 238 (1959).
- The fair market value is the price the property would bring if offered for sale in the open market by an owner who wanted to sell it, but was under no necessity to do so, and when purchased by a buyer who wanted to buy it, but was under no necessity to do so. *Bishop v. East Ohio Gas Co.*, 143 Ohio St. 541 (1944).
- For vehicles, the cost of repair may be recovered as well as the residual diminution of value, so long as it does not exceed the difference between the value of the property before and after the accident. *Rakich v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield*, 172 Ohio App.3d 523, 2007-Ohio-3739, 875 N.E.2d 993 (10th Dist.).
- For personal property without market value, the measure of damage is the reasonable value to the owner, if the property has been totally destroyed. If the property has not been totally destroyed, the measure of damage is the cost of repair to restore it to the condition it was in before it was damaged, provided the repairs do not exceed the reasonable value of the property to the owner. If repairs to the property will not restore its value, or if the cost of repairs exceeds its reasonable value to the owner, the measure of damage is the difference in reasonable value of the article to the owner immediately before and immediately after it was damaged. *Erie Rd. Co. v. Steinberg*, 94 Ohio St. 189 (1916); *Bishop v. East Ohio Gas Co.*, 143 Ohio St. 541 (1944); *Layton v. Ferguson Moving and Storage Co.*, 109 Ohio App. 541 (1st Dist. 1959).
- For an item to be assessed by its value to the owner (i.e. that it has no market value), the owner must show exceptional circumstances that warrant a departure from the market value rule. *White v. Ohio State Univ. College of Veterinary Med.*, 2009-Ohio-7034.

E. Admissibility of "Writedown" of Medical Bills

- In tort actions, defendants can admit into evidence that the plaintiff's medical providers accepted in payment for their services an amount less than the stated or face value of the medical bills.
- The plaintiff can introduce the full amount or stated "list" price of the medical services rendered. The defendant can introduce evidence that the medical provider accepted a negotiated reduction in, or "write off" of, the medical bills. *Robinson v. Bates*, 112 Ohio St.3d 17, 2006-Ohio-6362, 857 N.E.2d 1195; *Jaques v. Manton*, 125 Ohio St.3d 342, 2010-Ohio-1838, 928 N.E.2d 434.
- Expert testimony is not necessary to introduce evidence of write-offs reflected on medical bills and statements. O.R.C. §2317.421; *Moretz v. Muakkasa*, 137 Ohio St.3d 171, 2013-Ohio-4656, 998 N.E.2d 479.

F. Evidence of Collateral Benefits Paid to Plaintiff

- In any tort action, the defendant may introduce evidence of any amount payable as a benefit to the plaintiff as a result of the same injury, death or loss in issue, except if the source of collateral benefits has:
 - A mandatory self-effectuating federal right of subrogation;
 - A contractual right of subrogation;
 - A statutory right of subrogation;
 - Or, if the source pays the plaintiff a benefit in the form of a life insurance payment or disability payment. However, evidence of the life insurance payment or disability payment may be introduced if the plaintiff's employer paid for the life insurance or disability policy and the employer is a defendant in the tort action. O.R.C. §2315.20(A).
- If the defendant elects to introduce evidence of such collateral benefits, the plaintiff may introduce evidence of any amount that the plaintiff has paid or contributed to secure the plaintiff's right to receive the benefits about which the defendant has introduced evidence. O.R.C. §2315.20(B).
- A provider of subrogated collateral benefits, which are introduced at trial, shall not recover any amount against the plaintiff nor shall it be subrogated to the rights of the plaintiff against the defendant. O.R.C. §2315.20(C).

G. Prejudgment and Post Judgment Interest

1. Statutory Rate for Prejudgment and Post Judgment Interest.
 - 2021: 3%; 2020: 5%; 2019: 5%; 2018: 4%; 2017: 4%; 2016: 3%; 2015: 3%; 2014: 3%; 2013: 3%; 2012: 3%
 - Set every October 15th by the tax commissioner by adding 3% to the federal short term rate. O.R.C. §5703.47.
2. In tort actions, prejudgment interest will be awarded if, after a post judgment hearing, the trial court determines that:
 - a. The party who lost failed to make a good faith effort to settle, and
 - b. The party who won did not fail to make a good faith effort to settle. O.R.C. §1343.03(C)(1).
3. Where the losing party admitted liability in a pleading or acted with the deliberate purpose to cause harm, interest runs from the date the cause of action accrued to the date of the judgment. O.R.C. §1343.03(C)(1)(a) and (b).
4. In all other actions, prejudgment interest runs for the longer of the following periods:
 - a. From the date the winning party gave first notice and if the winning party made reasonable efforts to determine if the losing defendant had liability insurance and plaintiff gave written notice to the defendant and the liability insurer that the cause of action had accrued;

- b. From the date on which the prevailing plaintiff filed the lawsuit or pleading giving rise to the judgment. O.R.C. §1343.03(C)(1)(c)(i) and (ii).
- 5. No prejudgment interest on awards for future damages. O.R.C. §1343.03(C)(2).
- 6. Post judgment interest and interest on a settlement run from the date of the judgment or settlement until the satisfaction of the judgment or settlement. O.R.C. §1343.03(A) and (B); *Hartmann v. Duffey*, 95 Ohio St.3d 456, 2002-Ohio-2486, 768 N.E.2d 1170.

H. Parental Liability

- A parent can be civilly liable, up to \$10,000, to a property owner when the parent's minor child willfully damages property or commits a "theft offense." O.R.C. §3109.09(B).
- A parent can be civilly liable, up to \$10,000, to someone who is willfully and maliciously assaulted by the parent's minor child, by a means or force likely to produce great bodily harm. O.R.C. §3109.10.
- A parent and the parent's minor child are jointly and severally liable, up to \$15,000, for the child's acts of vandalism, desecration and ethnic intimidation. O.R.C. §2307.70(B)(1).
- Any negligence, or willful or wanton misconduct, that is committed by a minor when driving on a highway shall be imputed to the person who signed the application for the minor's probationary license. The person who signed the application shall be jointly and severally liable with the minor for any damages caused. O.R.C. §4507.07.

I. Settlement of a Claim by a Minor

- Settlements for greater than \$25,000 require the appointment of a guardian and approval by the probate court.
- Settlements for \$25,000 or less do not require appointment of a guardian, but still must be approved by the probate court. O.R.C. §2111.18 and §2111.05.

J. Statutory Damages

- A person who, without privilege to do so, recklessly cuts down, destroys or injures a vine, shrub, sapling, bush, tree or crop growing upon another's land or on public land is guilty of a misdemeanor of the fourth degree and subject to treble damages. O.R.C. §901.51 and §901.99.
- A consumer who proves a knowing violation of Ohio's Consumer Sales Practices Act may recover three times the amount of the consumer's actual economic damages or \$200, whichever is greater, plus an amount not exceeding \$5,000 in noneconomic damages or recover damages or other appropriate relief in a class action. O.R.C. §1345.09(B).

IV. NEGLIGENCE

A. Comparative Negligence

- The contributory fault of a person does not bar the person as a plaintiff from recovering damages that have directly and proximately resulted from the tortious conduct of one or more other persons, if the contributory fault of the plaintiff was not greater than the combined tortious conduct of all other persons from whom the plaintiff seeks recovery in the action and of all other persons from whom the plaintiff does not seek recovery in the action. O.R.C. §2315.33.
 - The court shall diminish any compensatory damages recoverable by the plaintiff by an amount that is proportionately equal to the percentage of tortious conduct of the plaintiff as determined by O.R.C. §2315.34. O.R.C. §2315.33.
- The contributory fault of the plaintiff may be asserted as an affirmative defense to any tort claim, except for intentional torts. O.R.C. §2315.32.
- If the plaintiff's percentage of negligent conduct is greater than the sum of the percentages of the tortious conduct attributable to the defendants in addition to non-parties, the plaintiff recovers nothing. O.R.C. §2315.35.
- If the plaintiff's negligence is less than 50% and less than the total negligence attributable to the defendants and non-parties, the plaintiff's compensatory damage award is reduced proportionally to the percentage of the plaintiff's negligent conduct. O.R.C. §2315.35.
 - For example, if the plaintiff is found to be 30% negligent and the jury awards \$100,000, the plaintiff's net recovery is \$70,000.
- The trier of fact shall return a general verdict, accompanied by interrogatory answers, that specify the percentage of negligence attributable to the plaintiff, to each defendant, and any attributable to non-parties. O.R.C. §2307.23(A)(1) and (2).
- Any defendant may argue that a non-party, against whom the plaintiff is not seeking recovery, is responsible for some or all of the tortious conduct. O.R.C. §2307.23(C). This is an affirmative defense which may be raised at any time before trial.

V. JOINT AND SEVERAL TORT LIABILITY

- Where there are two or more defendants, and all of whom are found to be 50% or less at fault, each is only liable for its proportionate share of the compensatory damages that represent economic loss. O.R.C. §2307.22(B).
- Where a defendant is found to be more than 50% at fault, that defendant shall be jointly and severally liable, in tort, for all compensatory damages that represent economic loss. O.R.C. §2307.22(A)(1).
- Each defendant who is determined to be 50% or less at fault shall be liable only for that defendant's proportionate share of the compensatory damages that represent economic loss. O.R.C. §2307.22(A)(2).
 - The proportionate share of such a defendant is calculated by multiplying the total amount of the economic damages awarded to the plaintiff, by the percentage of tortious conduct as attributable to that defendant. O.R.C. §2307.22(B).

- All defendants are only liable for their proportionate share of non-economic (pain and suffering) losses, regardless of their degree of fault. O.R.C. §2307.22(C).
- Intentional tort defendants are treated differently:
 - Any defendant found to be liable for an intentional tort is jointly and severally liable in tort for all compensatory damages that represent economic loss even if that defendant is less than 50% at fault. O.R.C. §2307.22(A)(3).
 - Each defendant against whom an intentional tort claim has not been alleged and established, and to whom 50% or less of the tortious conduct is attributable, is not jointly and severally liable with a co-defendant who has been found liable for an intentional tort. Instead, such a defendant, who is found liable, but **NOT** for an intentional tort, is liable only for that defendant's proportionate share of the compensatory damages that represent economic loss. O.R.C. §2307.22(A)(4).

VI. CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY

A. Contribution

- The right of contribution exists only in favor of the tortfeasor who has paid more than that tortfeasor's proportionate share of a common liability and that tortfeasor's total recovery is limited to the amount paid by that tortfeasor in excess of that tortfeasor's proportionate share. O.R.C. §2307.25(A).
- There is no right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor against whom an intentional tort claim has been established. O.R.C. §2307.25(A).
- A tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with a claimant is **NOT** entitled to contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability for the injury or loss is not extinguished by the settlement, or with respect to any amount paid in a settlement that is in excess of what is reasonable. O.R.C. §2307.25(B).
- A liability insurer which has discharged, in full or in part, the liability of the tortfeasor by payment, is subrogated to the tortfeasor's right of contribution to the extent of the amount it has paid in excess of the tortfeasor's proportionate share of the common liability. O.R.C. §2307.25(C).

B. Indemnity

- If one tortfeasor is entitled to indemnity from another, the right of the indemnity obligee is for indemnity and not contribution, and the indemnity obligor is not entitled to contribution from the obligee for any portion of the indemnity obligation. O.R.C. §2307.25(D).
- The proportionate shares of tortfeasors in the common liability is based on their relative degrees of legal responsibility. If equity requires the collective liability of some as a group, the group shall constitute a single share, and principles of equity applicable to contribution generally apply.
- Ohio law imposes certain restrictions on indemnity. In construction contracts, indemnity provisions that impose obligations upon the promisor to indemnify the promisee for damages caused by or resulting from the negligence of the promisee are void and against public policy. O.R.C. §2305.31.

C. Effect of a Payment and Release

- A release or covenant made in good faith does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability, unless its terms otherwise provide, but it reduces the claim against the other tortfeasors to the extent of the greater of any amount stipulated by the release or the amount of consideration paid for it, except that the reduction of the claim against the other tortfeasors shall not apply in any case in which the reduction results in the plaintiff recovering less than the total amount of the plaintiff's compensatory damages award. O.R.C. §2307.28(A).
- In any case in which the reduction does not apply, the plaintiff shall not recover more than the total amount of the plaintiff's compensatory damages awarded by the trier of fact. O.R.C. §2307.28(A).
- The release discharges the person to whom it is given from all liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor. O.R.C. §2307.28(B).

VII. AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE

A. Mandatory Liability Limits

- Bodily injury: \$25,000 per person/\$50,000 per accident. O.R.C. §4509.01(K).
- Property damage: \$25,000 per accident. O.R.C. §4509.01(K).
- UM/UIM coverage: The offering of Ohio UM/UIM coverage is optional. O.R.C. §3937.18(A).

B. Insurance for Transportation Network Company Gigs

- Ohio now regulates Transportation Network Companies ("TNC") and their ride finding platforms (i.e., Uber, Lyft).
- Ohio's laws re: minimum wages, unemployment insurance, and workers' compensation do **not** apply to TNC drivers. O.R.C. §4925.10(A).
- Unless agreed to by contract, TNC drivers are **NOT** employees or agents of the TNC. O.R.C. §4925.10(B) and (C).
- When a TNC driver is logged on to the TNC digital network and actually engaged in providing TNC services, there must be a primary auto insurance policy in place that has at least \$1 million of insurance coverage per accident for bodily injury and property damage liability. O.R.C. §3942.02(A)(2)(a)-(b).
- When the driver is logged on to the TNC digital network, and is available to receive ride requests, but is not yet engaged in TNC services, the insurance must only be at least \$50,000 per person/per accident and \$25,000 for property damage. O.R.C. §3942.02(A)(2).
- If the TNC's driver's auto insurance policy does not provide such minimum coverage, then the TNC's insurance must do so and it may not require the driver's policy to first deny coverage. O.R.C. §3942.02(B)(1)-(2).

- An auto insurer in Ohio may exclude coverage for any loss or injury that occurs while a TNC driver is logged on to a TNC's digital network or while the driver is providing TNC services. O.R.C. §3942.03(A).

C. Pro-rata v. Excess Coverage

- Where one carrier's policy applies on a pro-rata basis and another applies on an excess basis, the pro-rata coverage will be primary and the excess coverage will be excess. *Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co.*, 1 Ohio St.2d 105, 107 (1965).

D. UM/UIM Coverage

1. Not Excess Coverage

- UIM coverage is not excess coverage and shall only provide the insured an amount of protection not greater than that which would be available under the insured's UM coverage if the person or persons liable to the insured were uninsured at the time of the accident. O.R.C. §3937.18(C).

2. Set-Off

- The limits of UIM coverage shall be reduced by those amounts available for payment under all applicable bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured. O.R.C. §3937.18(C).

3. Stacking

- Any UM/UIM coverage may include terms and conditions that preclude any and all stacking of such coverages including, but not limited to, interfamily stacking, which is the aggregating of the limits of such coverages by the same person or two or more persons who are not members of the same household, and intrafamily stacking, which is the aggregating of the limits of such coverages purchased by the same person or two or more family members of the same household. O.R.C. §3937.18(F)(1) and (2).
- Any policy that includes UM coverage, or UIM coverage, or both, may include terms limiting all claims arising from any one person's bodily injury or death, to a single per person limit of liability, and, for the purpose of such policy limit, all those claims shall constitute a single claim. O.R.C. §3937.18(G).
- Auto insurers can validly preclude UM/UIM coverage for medical expenses when those same medical expenses have been paid, or are payable, under the same auto policy's Medical Payments coverage provisions. *State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Grace*, 123 Ohio St.3d 471(2009).

4. "Phantom" Vehicles

- A UM/UIM claim does not require "physical contact," but "independent corroborative evidence" must exist to prove that the injury or death was proximately caused by the negligence or intentional actions of an unidentified driver of a motor vehicle. The testimony of any insured seeking recovery from the insurer shall **not** constitute "independent corroborative evidence," unless the testimony is supported by additional evidence. O.R.C. §3937.18(B)(3).

5. Limitations Period

- UM/UIM coverage may include terms requiring that UM/UIM claims be made or brought within three years after the date of the accident or within one year after the tortfeasor's liability insurer has become the subject of insolvency proceedings whichever is later. O.R.C. §3937.18(H).

6. Exclusions

- Neither UM nor UIM coverage is subject to an exclusion or reduction in amount because of any workers' compensation benefits payable as a result of the same injury or death. O.R.C. §3937.18(E).
- UM/UIM coverage may include terms that preclude coverage under any of the following circumstances:
 1. When the insured is operating or occupying a motor vehicle owned by, furnished to, or available for the regular use of the named insured, a spouse, or a resident relative of a named insured, if the motor vehicle is not specifically identified in the policy under which a claim is made, or is not a newly acquired or replacement motor vehicle;
 2. When the insured is operating or occupying a motor vehicle without a reasonable belief that the insured is entitled to do so. Under no circumstance will an insured whose license has been suspended, revoked, or never issued be held to have a reasonable belief that the insured is entitled to operate a motor vehicle;
 3. When the injury or death is caused by a motor vehicle operated by any person who is specifically excluded from coverage for bodily injury liability in the policy under which the UM/UIM coverages are provided;
 4. While any employee, officer, director, partner, trustee, member, executor, administrator or beneficiary of the named insured, or any relative of any such person, is operating or occupying a motor vehicle, unless that person is operating or occupying a motor vehicle for which UM/UIM coverage is provided in the policy;
 5. When the person actually suffering the bodily injury or death is not an insured under the policy. O.R.C. §3937.18(I)(1)-(5).

E. Admissibility of Lack of Seatbelt, Protective Eye Device and Protective Helmet Use

- Failure to use a seatbelt is not admissible to prove negligence or comparative negligence but is admissible to reduce damages by showing that the failure to use contributed to the harm alleged in the action. O.R.C. §4513.263(F)(1).
- Operators and passengers of motorcycles and snowmobiles are required to wear safety glasses or another protective eye device. Operators and passengers of motorcycles who are under the age of 18 and/or who are operating the motorcycle with a "novice" license are required to wear a protective helmet. However, these requirements and any failure of an operator or passenger to comply with these requirements are not admissible in a trial of any civil action. O.R.C. §4511.53(C).

VIII. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTIONS

A. Joinder

- Insurers litigating coverage issues in a declaratory judgment action must name as parties all those whom the insurer seeks to be bound by the declaratory judgment. *The Estate of Heintzelman v. Air Experts, Inc.*, 126 Ohio St.3d 138, 2010-Ohio-3264.
- However, an insured can bring a declaratory judgment action directly against his/her/its insurer without joining claimants and potential judgment creditors, and those non-party claimants/potential judgment creditors are still bound by the outcome of the declaratory judgment action. O.R.C. §2721.02(C) and §3929.06(C)(2).

B. Insurer's Coverage Defenses Against Supplemental Petitions

- Once a claimant or judgment creditor obtains a judgment against the insured, the claimant or judgment creditor can, after 30 days of final judgment, if the judgment remains unsatisfied, file suit directly against the defendant/judgment debtor's insurer to try to collect the judgment. O.R.C. §2721.02(B) and §3929.06 (A)(2).
- In defense of such a supplemental petition or declaratory judgment action, the insurer may assert, as an affirmative defense against the judgment creditor, any coverage defense that the insurer possesses and could assert against the insured. O.R.C. §2721.02(C) and §3929.06(C)(1).

IX. INSURANCE COVERAGE

A. Construction Defect Claims

- Claims of defective construction or workmanship brought by a property owner are not claims for "property damage" caused by an "occurrence" under a commercial general liability policy. *Westfield Ins. Co. v. Custom Agri Sys., Inc.*, 133 Ohio St.3d 476, 2012-Ohio-4712.
- In the absence of consequential damage, a contractor's CGL Policy does NOT cover claims for property damage caused by a subcontractor's faulty work due to a lack of an "occurrence." *Ohio N. Univ. v. Charles Constr. Servs.*, 2018-Ohio-4057.
- Trigger: Ohio appellate courts' holdings vary as to whether construction defect claims are subject to a "continuous trigger" or a "manifestation trigger" or an "injury in fact trigger." Litigants will need to know the case law of their appellate district as the Ohio Supreme Court has not yet addressed the trigger issue in the construction defect context.

B. Allocation

- In the environmental pollution context (*Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co.*, 95 Ohio St.3d 512, 2002-Ohio-2842) and the progressive injury (i.e., asbestos exposure) context (*Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co. v. Park-Ohio Industries, Inc.*, 2010-Ohio-2745), where the losses occurred over time, the Ohio Supreme Court has adopted an "all sums" approach, meaning that all policies in effect during the loss period were triggered. Thus, the insured can target one insurer from which it is able to obtain a defense and indemnity for any covered judgment. The targeted insurer is then able to seek recovery or "contribution" from the non-targeted insurers.

C. Employer Intentional Tort

- An insurer has no duty to defend an employer intentional tort case against the insured employer, even where an exclusion applies to injury resulting from an act that is "determined to have been committed" by an insured with the belief that an injury is substantially certain to occur. *Ward v. United Foundries, Inc.*, 129 Ohio St.3d 292, 2011-Ohio-3176.
- An insurance provision that excludes coverage for acts committed with the deliberate intent to injure an employee precludes coverage for employer intentional torts. *Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. DTJ Ents., Inc. (In re Hoyle)*, 143 Ohio St.3d 197, 2015-Ohio-843.

D. Punitive Damages

- Ohio law prohibits auto and other casualty and liability insurance policies from providing coverage for punitive damages. O.R.C. §3937.182(B). However, depending on the policy language, a policy might cover the attorney fee component of a punitive damage award. *Neal-Pettit v. Lahman*, 125 Ohio St.3d 327, 2010-Ohio-1829.

E. Retroactive Cancellation of Liability Insurance

- No retroactive cancellation or annulment of liability insurance is permitted after the insured becomes responsible for damages on account of bodily injury or death by accident. O.R.C. §3929.05.

F. Contract Void *Ab Initio*

- A contract for insurance may be void *ab initio* if there is a misstatement in the contract, or in an application for insurance that is explicitly incorporated into the policy, if the misstatement constitutes a warranty, not merely a representation. A warranty is a statement, description or undertaking by the insured of a material fact appearing either on the face of the policy or in another instrument specifically incorporated into the policy. *Allstate v. Boggs*, 27 Ohio St.2d 216 (1971).

G. Jurisdiction

- An Ohio court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident based solely on the conduct of the nonresident's insurance company. *Fraley v. Estate of Oeding*, 138 Ohio St.3d 250, 2014-Ohio-452, 6 N.E.3d 9.
- A domicile is where a person resides, where he intends to remain, and where he intends to return when away temporarily. A person's intent, coupled with objective facts, establishes his domicile. *Schill v. Cincinnati Ins. Co.*, 2014-Ohio-4527.

X. SUBROGATION AND LIENS

A. The Make Whole Doctrine

- Effective 9/29/15, Ohio codified the “Make Whole Doctrine.”
- Pursuant to that doctrine, if less than the full value of the tort action is recovered for comparative negligence, or by reason of the collectability of the full value of the claim, resulting from limited liability insurance or any other cause, the subrogee’s claim shall be reduced in the same proportion as the injured party’s interest is diminished. O.R.C. §2323.44(B).

B. Workers’ Compensation Subrogation

- The Ohio Revised Code creates a right of recovery in favor of a statutory subrogee against a third party, and the statutory subrogee is subrogated to the rights of a claimant against that third party. O.R.C. §4123.931(A).
- There is a complex statutory formula for determining the amount of the subrogation interest. O.R.C. §4123.931(B).
- The right of workers’ compensation subrogation is automatic, regardless of whether a statutory subrogee is joined as a party in an action by a claimant against a third party. O.R.C. §4123.931(H).
- The statutory subrogation right applies to, but is not limited to, amounts recoverable from a claimant’s insurer in connection with UM/UIM coverage. O.R.C. §4123.931(I)(1). The Bureau of Workers Compensation can pursue a lien, even if the injured party declines to do so, but would have to prove liability as well as damages.

C. Ohio Medicaid Subrogation

- The acceptance of Medicaid benefits gives an automatic right of subrogation to The Ohio Dept. of Medicaid and/or the respective county equivalent against the third party for the cost of the medical assistance paid on behalf of the public assistance recipient or participant. O.R.C. §5160.37(A).
- No settlement, judgment or award of any recovery in any action or claim by a recipient or participant shall be made final without first giving the department or county department written notice and a reasonable opportunity to perfect their rights of recovery. O.R.C. §5160.37(E). If the departments are not given the appropriate written notice, the recipient or participant and, if there is one, the recipient’s attorney, are liable to reimburse the departments for the recovery received to the extent of medical payments made by the departments. O.R.C. §5160.37(E).
- The departments shall be permitted to enforce their subrogation rights against a third party even though they accepted prior payments in discharge of their rights if, at the time the departments received such payments, they were not aware that additional medical expenses had been incurred but had not yet been paid by the departments. O.R.C. §5160.37(F).
- The third party becomes liable to The Ohio Dept. of Medicaid and/or the respective county equivalent as soon as the third party is notified in writing of the valid claims for recovery under the Medicaid statutes. O.R.C. §5160.37(F).
- It is incumbent on the welfare recipient to inform The Ohio Dept. of Medicaid and/or the respective county equivalent that he or she is pursuing a third party recovery. O.R.C. §5160.37(C).
- A payment, settlement, compromise, judgment, or award that purports to exclude the cost of medical assistance paid for by The Ohio Dept. of Medicaid and/or the respective county equivalent shall not preclude the department from enforcing its subrogation rights. O.R.C. §5160.37(A).

D. Federal Medicare Subrogation

- Federal regulations grant Medicare subrogation and lien rights superior to any other lien or interest on any settlement or judgment proceedings, including Medicaid. 42 U.S.C. §1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii).
- These rights apply even though no lien or other notice was sent and even when the liability insurer and the party’s attorneys are not aware that payments have been made by Medicare, if such persons or parties should have been aware of Medicare’s interest.
- If Medicare is not reimbursed, the third party payer must still reimburse Medicare even though it has already reimbursed the beneficiary or other party. 42 CFR §411.24(i).

XI. OHIO FAIR CLAIMS PRACTICES ACT – Unfair Property/Casualty Claims Settlement Practices

- An insurer shall fully disclose to first party claimants all pertinent benefits, coverages or other provisions of an insurance contract under which a claim is presented. OAC 3901-1-54(E)(1).
- An insurer shall acknowledge the receipt of a claim within 15 days of receiving notice. OAC 3901-1-54(F)(2).
- An insurer shall respond within 15 days to any communication from the claimant when that communication suggests that a response is appropriate. OAC 3901-1-54(F)(3).
- An insurer shall decide whether to accept or deny a claim within 21 days of the receipt of a properly executed proof of loss. If more time is needed to investigate, the insurer shall notify the claimant, within the 21-day period, and explain the need for more time. If an extension of time is needed, the insurer has a continuing obligation to notify the claimant, in writing, at least every 45 days, of the status of the investigation and the continued time for the investigation. OAC 3901-1-54(G)(1).
- If the insurer reasonably believes that the claimant has fraudulently caused or contributed to the loss, such information shall be presented to the fraud division of the Ohio Department of Insurance within 60 days of receipt of the proof of loss. OAC 3901-1-54(G)(1).
- No insurer shall deny a claim on the grounds of a specific policy provision, condition or exclusion unless reference to such provision, condition or exclusion is included in the denial. OAC 3901-1-54(G)(2).
- Notice shall be given to claimants, at least 60 days before the expiration of any statute of limitation or contractual time limit, where the insurer has not been advised that the claimant is represented by legal counsel. OAC 3901-1-54(G)(5).

Amendments to the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure and Appellate Procedure

The new Ohio rules, effective July 1, 2020, impose a number of changes to pretrial procedure and discovery, which mirror federal civil practice. The Amended Appellate Rules include changes to word and time limits for briefs and oral arguments, respectively.

- **Civ. R. 4.7.** A plaintiff may seek a waiver of service from a defendant that is subject to service under Civ. R. 4 through 4.6. In the absence of good cause, a defendant that fails to waive could be required to pay costs and fees.
- **Civ. R. 16(B).** The trial court is required to issue a scheduling order *sua sponte*, after consultation with parties, or after receiving 26(F) report.
- **Civ. R. 26(F).** The parties must confer no later than 21 days before the court's scheduling conference in order to develop a proposed discovery plan and address other pretrial issues. Parties must submit their Rule 26(F) report within 14 days after the Rule 26(F) conference.
- **Civ. R. 26(B)(3).** Parties must make initial disclosures no later than the first pretrial or CMC, unless a party objects or the court orders otherwise.
- **Civ. R. 26(B)(1).** Scope of discovery allows parties to obtain discovery regarding any non-privileged matter that is relevant to the claims or defenses and proportional to the needs of the case. The rule amendment eliminates the previous standard allowing parties to seek information "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
- **Civ. R. 26(B)(6).** Language regarding limitations on frequency and extent of discovery, which previously related to electronic discovery only is now generally applicable.
- **Civ. R. 26(B)(7).** The reports of experts must be exchanged. An expert may not testify unless a written report has been provided to opposing counsel.
- **Civ. R. 53(C)(2).** The procedure for a magistrate judge to preside over a civil trial by consent of the parties is now streamlined.
- **App. R. 19.** Word limit for opening and responsive briefs is 9,000 words (30 pages or under at 12-point font is presumed compliant). Word limit for replies is 4,500 words (15 pages or under at 12-point font is presumed compliant).
- **App. R. 21.** Each side is now allowed 15 minutes for oral argument (previously allowed 30 minutes).

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Weston Hurd LLP is pleased to offer complimentary seminars to its insurance clients

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- **Insurance Coverage for Claims Arising from the Use of the Internet or Other Electronic Media**
- **Insurance Coverage for Construction-Related Claims in Ohio**
- **#MeToo! Coverage for Workplace Claims**
- **Splitting Files: Implications on Handling Liability and Coverage Claims**
- **When Churches Go to Court**
- **Considerations for Claims Arising in the Gig Economy**
- **First Party Property Damage Coverage for Business Interruption Claims Debate**
- **Business Interruption Coverage and the Coronavirus**
- **2020 Case Law & Legislative Developments Impacting Insurance from the Covid-19 Virus**

For more information about the Insurance topics, please contact:
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- **Understanding Claims for Violations of the Design and Construction Accessibility Requirements Under the Fair Housing Act**
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- **Business Continuity During Covid-19 – Force Majeure Clauses**
- **Engineering Ethics and Case Studies**
- **Covid-19 Related Issues – Insurance and Risk Management**

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- **Workplace Investigations**
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For additional copies of the *2021 Desktop Legal Primer for Ohio Claims* and/or to add colleagues to Weston Hurd's e-mail and mailing lists for insurance-related publications and e-advisories, please contact: Maria Murphy 216.687.3383
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Map of Ohio's Appellate Districts




Photo by: Jack F. Schultz-Intricate Imagery Photography

"The Licking County Courthouse was designed by architect H.E. Myer of Cleveland and completed in 1878 for \$190,000. Located at 1 Courthouse Square in the county seat of Newark, the building is still in use and today houses the Licking County Court of Common Pleas and its probate and juvenile divisions.

The courthouse is constructed of limestone and is supported by a sandstone foundation. The building features Second Empire style architecture and is one of the finest examples of the style in Ohio. The courthouse also has 11 identical statues of Lady Justice, one at each entrance to the building, as well as a predominant clock tower. The current courthouse was built after a fire consumed its predecessor, which was built in 1832.

Licking County is named for the Licking River and also the nearby salt flats. The courthouse was placed on the National Register of Historic Places in 1973."

Source:

(Civic Education-Ohio Courthouses. Retrieved from: <http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/Courthouses/Licking.asp>. Accessed 21 January 2021.)