I was recently asked to make a presentation regarding arbitration clauses before a national dealer group. I went through past issues of You Auto Know and since 2001, I have drafted five You Auto Knows on arbitration clauses. I went from being a great proponent of arbitrations to recommending that each matter be reviewed independently to determine whether or not arbitration would be applicable. Let me provide you with snippets of my position over the years.
June 2001 You Auto Know: “First it must be established that arbitration is viewed as a good procedure to follow in order to resolve legal disputes. The reasoning is that arbitration is generally much quicker, less costly, the matter is heard either in front of one or three impartial arbitrators, and the court system is not being tied up with litigation … This author highly recommends an arbitration provision in each and every Buyer’s Order.”
March 2014 You Auto Know: “First, it must be noted that this author is absolutely in favor of having an arbitration clause in your Buyer’s Order …. Even a poorly written arbitration clause provides you with a window of opportunity to stay any litigation in court in the attempt to have the matter arbitrated.”
January 2008 You Auto Know: “At first, the arbitration clauses worked very well, not only on behalf of the dealer, but also on behalf of the consumer. The reason behind this was the fact that the parties were able to have an impartial hearing within a short period of time after the arbitration was filed.” “However, there was one downfall to the arbitration. The Plaintiff’s attorney fees were significantly reduced. Obviously, this lead to litigation which has substantially redefined the arbitration system.” “… if a plaintiff pleads that the arbitration clause was one of adhesion and he or she was coerced into executing an unconscionable agreement, then the Court has the ability to hold a full blown hearing (trial) specifically on the topic of the arbitration clause itself.” “… parties must incur time and litigation expenses in determining whether or not the arbitration is valid …” “The downside for the dealer in any arbitration is still a ‘runaway’ arbitrator(s) who chooses to ignore the law and award damages to an undeserving plaintiff.”
The upside to a well written arbitration clause is the inclusion of a “class action waiver.” Although this is under attack throughout the United States by plaintiffs’ attorneys and activist judges, the inclusion of the class action waiver clause has been upheld and therefore precludes the individual consumer plaintiff from participating or instituting a class action lawsuit. Obviously, this is important if one knows that plaintiff’s counsel is seeking to pursue a class action against a dealership. However, in ordinary consumer cases, there are downsides. As I indicated before, plaintiffs are entitled to what I call a “trial within a trial,” specifically, Ohio Revised Code §2711.023 permits a plaintiff to challenge the arbitration clause based upon its terms or conditions and the manner in which the clause was executed. In the legal practice, it is known as substantive unconscionability and procedural unconscionability. In essence, this permits a plaintiff to pursue discovery, interrogatories, requests for production of documents, admissions and depositions against the business/dealership regarding the formulation and utilization of the arbitration clause itself. Since this is a final appealable order by the court, either the plaintiff or the dealership has the right to appeal and, obviously, the appellate process can take an additional year. This means additional time and cost before the actual consumer case is even heard. Quoting my October 2011 You Auto Know, “Further, I have found that most plaintiffs’ attorneys who are willing to run to arbitration generally do so because they have a weak case. They believe that since discovery process is limited, they have a better opportunity to present a weak case to an arbitrator.” It is not necessary for an arbitrator to specifically follow the Rules of Civil Procedure or the Rules of Evidence in a hearing, therefore, there is the danger to present evidence and testimony that would not be permissible in a courtroom situation. Further, in order to overcome one of the main objections to arbitration by a consumer, businesses will generally agree to pay the full arbitration fee schedule and the arbitrator’s time and costs. Regardless of the independent arbitration sources that you utilize, this can be very expensive. For example, one arbitration source will only use retired judges and you will pay their time, travel, and hotel accommodations to be present for the arbitration. Next, there is always the issue of obtaining a rogue arbitrator who does not or will not follow the law. Does this happen? Absolutely! In this situation, the arbitrator will find for the plaintiff simply out of sympathy and will craft a decision to support his or her bias. The decision can be hard to understand. There really is no appeal process to the arbitrations unless it can be shown that there is evident partiality or bias on behalf of the arbitrator and this is very difficult to prove.
Further, some arbitration sources state that if you use their name in an arbitration clause, then the business is obligated to submit the business’ arbitration clause to the entity for review to determine if it follows the guidelines for that arbitration source. This is particularly true of the American Arbitration Association. Quoting the American Arbitration rules, “Upon receiving the arbitration agreement, the AAA will review the agreement for material compliance with due process standards contained into consumer due process protocol … There is a non-refundable fee to conduct this initial review … Any subsequent changes, additions or deletions or amendments … to an arbitration agreement must be resubmitted for review and a fee will be assessed at that time … Further, “after the AAA reviews a submitted consumer clause, receives the annual consumer registration fee and determines it will administer consumer related disputes filed pursuant to the arbitration clause, the business will be included in the publicly accessible consumer clause registry … Therefore, in order for you to utilize AAA, your arbitration clause must be approved by AAA, for a fee, and you will pay a yearly fee to AAA besides the actual arbitration fees and costs.
I realize the choice to go to arbitration should be determined on a case by case basis. I do not believe that each and every matter should automatically go to arbitration. This is a situation where you and your legal counsel will have to determine the facts of the matter and the strengths and weaknesses of not only your case, but the plaintiff’s case. Therefore an informed decision should be made as to the best venue to try the case. In many cases, a court will throw out a number of the plaintiff’s claims based upon the filing of a Motion for Summary Judgment which will streamline the issues at hand. Although permitted, many arbitrators refuse to rule on motions for summary judgment believing that any and all issues should be presented whether warranted or not.
Again, make sure you have an arbitration clause with a class action waiver, but choose the location of your battle wisely. You may find out that going to court is better.
CONTACT INFORMATION
Robert A. Poklar, Esq.
Weston Hurd LLP
The Tower at Erieview
1301 East 9th Street, Suite 1900
Cleveland, Ohio 44114-1862
p: 216.687.3243; f: 216.621.8369
Although production has slowed, some companies continue to build pipelines associated with transporting shale gas and oil here in Ohio. Private landowners often attempt to deny pipeline companies access to their property for the usual reasons such as not wanting what seems like trespassers on their property. However, the Ohio Ninth District Court of Appeals recently confirmed that under Ohio Revised Code Section 1723.01, pipeline companies have the clear right to enter private property to conduct survey activities.
Landowners argued that the statute allowed the pipeline company to survey only in connection with an actual appropriation (taking) of the land. The court ruled that the pipeline company could enter even before an appropriation action and without a showing of necessity.
This ruling confirms that many utility companies have broad access rights to a landowner’s private property. However, such rights are not unfettered. Nothing physically can be done to private property except with a landowner’s permission or after a legal process has run its course.
If you have any questions about this topic, feel free to contact Dana Rose or your Weston Hurd attorney.
Contact Information
Dana A. Rose
drose@westonhurd.com
216.687.3342
On May 23, 2016, the United States Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division (DOL-WHD), issued its final rule relating to overtime requirements under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The new rules become effective December 1, 2016. This gives employers six short months to figure out how to comply with the new requirements. The most significant change is raising the salary threshold from $455 per week to $913 per week, which on an annualized basis represents an increase from $23,660 to $47,476.
What does this mean for the typical employer? It means most salaried “exempt” employees earning less than $47,476 a year will no longer be eligible for the old overtime exemption. If they work overtime (e.g. more than 40 hours per week), they must be paid overtime wages. Employers must figure out a strategy for employees who were previously treated as exempt. Weston Hurd LLP can help employers determine what options are available for employees who are directly impacted by the new overtime rules.
Also, it is expected that the Department of Labor will commit significant resources to enforce the new rules.
Employers should anticipate that, if the DOL-WHD comes calling, they will also be interested in reviewing job descriptions to determine if any misclassification issues exist. Weston Hurd can also assist employers with this review.
For help in understanding these new rules and insuring that your company is compliant, please contact your Weston Hurd attorney.
Employers should become familiar with a newly enacted federal law which affects their ability to enforce trade secrets protections against their employees and independent contractors. In summary, the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (“DTSA”), enacted on May 11, 2016, is a new federal law which:
Expands an employer’s ability to bring trade secret misappropriation claims under federal jurisdiction;
- Protects certain employees and independent contractors who disclose trade secrets under limited whistleblower protections; and
- Obligates employers to provide written notice of the DTSA’s whistleblower immunity protections in any contract or agreement that governs the use of the employer’s trade secrets or confidential information. [1]
The DTSA creates a federal cause of action for the misappropriation of trade secrets if such trade secrets are related to products or services used in or intended for use in, interstate commerce. Before the enactment of the DTSA, claims for trade secret theft were solely adjudicated under varying state laws. This created an inconsistent patchwork of state rulings not only in the application of trade secret laws, but also in the type of protections and damages a litigant could receive should they bring a successful claim for trade secret misappropriation. Fortunately, the DTSA provides an opportunity for uniformity in defining trade secret protections and enforcement at the federal level. For example, employers can now move for the following remedies under the DTSA in federal courts:
- Actual damages and damages for unjust enrichment;
- Exemplary damages (not to exceed two (2) times more than what the actual damages would be);
- Reasonable attorneys’ fees for misappropriations made in bad faith, or found to be malicious and willful; and
- Injunctive relief. [2]
In cases involving “extraordinary circumstances” as defined under the DTSA, the new law provides a mechanism for courts to issue
ex parte civil seizure orders of property to prevent further dissemination of trade secrets.
[3]
The DTSA’s statute of limitations is three years from the date on which the theft or misappropriation of the trade secret occurred, or reasonably should have been discovered by the employer.
[4]
Additionally, the DTSA provides certain whistleblower immunity protections for individuals who disclose an employer’s trade secrets under three limited scenarios:
- A confidential disclosure made, either directly or indirectly, to an attorney or federal, state, or local government official, solely for the purpose of reporting or investigating the suspected violation of law;
- A disclosure, filed under seal, made in a complaint or other document related to a lawsuit or other proceeding; or
- A disclosure made by an individual who files a claim of retaliation against an employer for the individual’s reporting of a suspected violation of law; provided that such disclosure is made to an attorney or in a court proceeding under seal, and the individual does not otherwise disclose a trade secret except pursuant to a court order. [5]
The whistleblower protections apply to both state and federal claims of trade secret misappropriation, and also to civil and criminal allegations thereof.
The DTSA requires each employer to provide written notice of the whistleblower disclosure immunity in “any contract or agreement with an employee [or independent contractor] that governs the use of trade secrets and confidential information.” [6] Consequently, this notice requirement applies to a vast array of employment and service related agreements, including employment agreements, independent contractor service agreements, confidentiality agreements, business protection agreements, consulting agreements, separation agreements and non-disclosure agreements. Accordingly, this whistleblower immunity notice must be added to each agreement referenced above, or alternatively, cross-referenced in each agreement to an employer policy provided to employees and contractors which governs the use of the employer’s trade secrets or confidential information.
Employers who do not comply with the notice requirement under the DTSA are not completely barred from filing claims under the DTSA, but are barred from recovering exemplary damages or attorneys’ fees under federal DTSA claims. [7]
The DTSA is not retroactively applied, but does apply to all agreements and misappropriation claims as of May 12, 2016. Furthermore, the DTSA does not preempt state laws regarding theft or misappropriation of trade secrets, except for the provisions related to the whistleblower immunity protections and notice requirements.
Employers are advised to contact your Weston Hurd attorney to review and revise your employment related contracts, service agreements, and confidentiality policies to ensure compliance with the DTSA.
[2] 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)
[3] 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)
[5] 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(1) – (b)(2)
[6] 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(4)
[7] 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(3)(C).
In the October 2015 You Auto Know©, we discussed the proposed bill that would have amended Ohio’s Constitution to permit medical and recreational use of marijuana. The measure, in the November election, was resoundingly defeated primarily due to the fact that a monopoly was going to control the growing and distribution of the drug. Very quietly on June 8, 2016, Governor Kasich signed into legislation a law that would create a tightly controlled, permissible use, of medical marijuana. The law will go into effect 90 days from the date the Secretary of State officially files the law. The mechanics of the law are somewhat cumbersome, but it would be a regulated program controlled by the Ohio Department of Commerce, State Pharmacy Board and State Medical Board. I will not go into detail about the law since it is over 84 pages. The law specifically states that smoking or growing marijuana is strictly prohibited. The lawmakers believe that smoking would be detrimental to a person’s health and would go against public health messages against cigarette smoking. Therefore, the only forms of medical marijuana that will be dispensed are oils, tinctures, plant material, edibles and patches. Further, there is an opening for “any other form approved by the State Board of Pharmacy” under Section 3796.061 of the Revised Code. It must be noted that vaporization of medical marijuana is permitted, but again, smoking it is not. There is a list of medical conditions that are approved for a patient seeking medical marijuana. For example, epilepsy, Crohn’s disease, Parkinson’s disease, PTSD, Tourette Syndrome, traumatic brain injury and others. The patient, through his physician, must seek approval from the previously mentioned Board in order to obtain the proper authorization. The application includes a statement by the physician indicating:
- There is a physician-patient relationship;
- The patient has been designated with a qualifying medical condition;
- The physician has informed the patient of the risk and benefits of medical marijuana; and
- The benefits outweigh the risk.
Thereafter, certain individuals in the State of Ohio will be able to use marijuana for medical purposes. How does this affect you as an employer? First, patients who utilize medical marijuana will have “an affirmative defense” if they are arrested and prosecuted for marijuana possession. However, as reiterated in the October 2016 You Auto Know©, the possession, distribution and manufacture of Schedule 1 drugs (of which marijuana is included, with heroin and LSD) is illegal pursuant to federal law. As noted in the October article, the Department of Justice stated that enforcing federal marijuana laws was not high on its list. Regardless, federal tax laws do treat the marijuana industry as a criminal activity. However, if the State of Ohio is operating the system, it is doubtful that the IRS will become involved in any enforcement and highly unlikely that state prosecutors will file charges against anyone with the documented medical marijuana permission. The question that you are asking is whether or not you have to retain an employee who cannot pass a drug test for using medical marijuana. Section 3796.98(A) of the law specifically states, “Nothing in this chapter does any of the following:
- Requires an employer to permit or accommodate an employee’s use, possession, or distribution of medical marijuana;
- Prohibits an employer from refusing to hire, discharging, disciplining or otherwise taking an adverse employment action against a person with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of that person’s use, possession, or distribution of medical marijuana;
- Prohibits an employer from establishing and enforcing a drug testing policy, drug free work place policy or zero tolerance drug policy.
In that regard, the employer cannot be sued by an individual for failing to hire, to discharge, to discipline or to seek discrimination or retaliation claims against the employer for terminating the individual for medical marijuana use. The termination will be deemed as discharged for just cause purposes in order for the business to have a drug free work place and zero tolerance policy or any other policies that the business has established through its employee handbook.
Well, there you have it in a nutshell. Simply because an individual has a medical marijuana permit does not mean that the dealership cannot terminate that employee for cause under its employee handbook for substance abuse.
2016 – You Auto Know! – Up in Smoke Update – June
You Auto Know! Social Media Update
By Robert A. Poklar
As you know, in the past this author has written articles on social media. Recently, I received a call from an attorney in another state asking for advice on a problem where a salesperson was sending text messages to potential customers. Some issues arose regarding the context of the texts. Thereafter, we entered into a general discussion as to what safeguards this client had taken with his employees regarding parameters for usage of social media during and after work hours. As I have stated in prior issues of You Auto Know, employers can discipline employees for violations of a social media policy. However, there are multiple issues and a myriad of laws which can be broken by disciplinary action. Specifically, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) complaints. Let’s look at a couple of examples from some of the NLRB advice memos. In these scenarios, you can change the employee position and make it a salesperson or service person in a dealership.
In the first example, the owner of a restaurant terminated a bartender for Facebook complaints. The bartender was venting to his sister on Facebook about how his night went. He had not received a raise in five years and he was doing waitress work without tips. The employer, taking his cue from the employee, the disgruntled bartender, sent a termination notice to the bartender’s Facebook page. The NLRB got involved to try to determine whether there was a violation. It was determined there was no violation because the bartender did not engage in a “concerted activity.” He did not discuss his issues with any other employees or co-workers and no co-workers responded to his posting. Further, he did not attempt to encourage other employees to form a group relative to his termination. The NLRB indicated its test for concerted activity is “whether the employee is engaged in, with or on the authority of other employees, and not merely by or on behalf of the employee, himself.” Therefore, if other employees had joined in and concerns were expressed by other employees, this would be a collective activity, or where individual employees are asked to initiate and prepare for a group action. The key is, are there group complaints truly involved?
The second example involves a Walmart employee who posted a rant against his manager on his Facebook page. In this instance, the majority of his Facebook friends were co-workers and several responded to his rants. Walmart disciplined the employee for putting offensive material on Facebook about the manager. The employee was given a day leave and denied promotion for 12 months. Again, the NLRB general counsel stated that this was not concerted activity since the employee’s complaints were his own personal grievances, rather than a grievance which would apply to all employees.
The third fact pattern which may have similarities to a dealership involves an employee who put comments on her Facebook page during her night shift which included negative references about the business’ clientele. It must be noted that none of her Facebook friends were co-workers; however, a former client of the facility saw the comments and complained to the employer about the negative comments related to the business. The employee was terminated, stating, “the business is invested in protecting the people they do business with and not to use a customer’s actions for personal amusement.” In this case, again, since no other employees responded, nor did she attempt to induce or prepare for group action, there was no violation. However, the NLRB strongly recommends that before an employer takes action to terminate an employee for social media issues, the matter should be thoroughly discussed with legal counsel.
Recently, this author was involved in a customer dispute with a dealership. Basically, the dealership F&I manager made a minor mistake in a lease agreement. The F&I manager contacted the customer in order to have the customer come back and re-sign the lease agreement. At that time, it appeared that the customer was amenable to honoring the request. The customer did not show up at the scheduled appointment due to a business conflict. When the customer did not show up, the salesperson sent a very threatening text to the customer. In essence, the salesperson called the customer a “deadbeat” and if he did not re-sign the lease agreement, then the dealership would call the police and have him arrested for theft of the vehicle. The customer, a seasoned business executive, naturally contacted his legal counsel. When I talked to the customer’s legal counsel, he indicated that there was derogatory communication from the dealership to the customer. Further, the customer will no longer do business with the dealership. I asked the general manager to talk to all persons involved in the transaction to see what communication was sent to the customer. I was assured that no derogatory emails were sent and that only the F&I manager had been in communication. When I communicated this to the customer’s legal counsel, he stated that it was not an email, but a text from the salesperson. He provided me with a screen capture of the text. I provided the text to the general manager who, in essence, went ballistic. The dealership did have a social media policy in place and the salesperson was terminated due to the text. However, the damage had already been done.
As I have recommended in the past, the dealership should implement a social media policy to place restrictions on how, when, where, what and why an employee can use or create statements on social media. The dealership should have one primary individual who will handle any questions regarding what is or is not appropriate for social media communications. Further, that individual should have authority to analyze whether a particular situation is a violation and what the consequences should be. There should be restrictions as to when social media can be used, who is posting the comment, the comments should only pertain to company business and no other business, it should specifically list prohibited categories, and the employee should not have his/her own individual page on the company’s web sites.
Also, the company should monitor the social media activities of its employees. Obviously, it is difficult when someone is texting on a private phone; however, if the text deals with company business, then it can be argued that the employee has to follow the policies and procedures regarding social media of the social media guidelines of a dealership.
If you have not already implemented a social media policy, it is strongly urged that you do so as quickly as possible.
Note: Portions of this issue of You Auto Know originally appeared in a 2012 issue and have been updated for this version.
Today, the Department of Labor (DOL) issued its much anticipated final rule expanding overtime eligibility. The final rule sets the minimum salary threshold for overtime exemption at $47,476. Under the new rule, all salaried employees making less than $47,476 must be paid overtime for all hours worked over 40 in a regular work week, no matter their duties. This new rule will go into effect on December 1, 2016.
Although the final salary threshold is somewhat lower than the initial threshold proposed in July 2015, the DOL still anticipates the new threshold will result in over four million employees becoming eligible for overtime.
As we have advised in prior client alerts, it is important that employers undertake a thorough review of their pay practices to determine whether any of their salaried employees are at or near the $47,476 threshold. More detailed recommendations for employers to comply with the new law will follow.
If you have any questions about the final rule, please contact your Weston Hurd attorney.
In World Harvest Church v. Grange Mutual Casualty Company, slip opinion 2016-Ohio-2913, decided on May 12, 2016, the Ohio Supreme Court enforced an abuse exclusion in a commercial insurance policy, finding no coverage for damages awarded against an employer found liable for its employee’s physical abuse of a child in the care, custody or control of the employer.
Factual and Procedural Background
In 2006, Michael and Lacey Faieta filed suit against World Harvest Church (“WHC”) and its employee, Richard Vaughan, alleging that Vaughan beat their two-and-a-half-year-old son while the child was attending WHC’s daycare center. WHC settled the Faietas’ lawsuit for $3.1 million and sought to have its commercial carrier, Grange Mutual Casualty Company (“Grange”), reimburse it for a portion of the settlement. Grange denied WHC’s insurance claim, and WHC filed suit.
The commercial insurance policy included a corporal punishment endorsement that provided coverage for injuries that result from the corporal punishment of a student administered by or at the direction of the insured. The policy also had an “Abuse or Molestation Exclusion” (“abuse exclusion”) which excluded coverage for bodily injury arising from “the actual or threatened abuse or molestation by anyone of any person while in the care, custody or control of any insured” or the negligent supervision of a person for whom any insured is or ever was legally responsible. Grange argued, in part, that the abuse exclusion excluded coverage for WHC’s claim.
The trial court sided with WHC, and the Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed part of the trial court’s decision finding Grange had to cover WHC for an amount of compensatory damages, attorney fees, and post judgment interest. The Ohio Supreme Court accepted Grange’s discretionary appeal.
Ohio Supreme Court Holding
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Tenth District’s determination that Grange is responsible for coverage for damages awarded to the Faietas, finding that the language of Grange’s abuse exclusion bars coverage for an award of damages based on WHC’s vicarious liability arising from Vaughan’s abuse of the child while in WHC’s care and custody.
Rationale
The Court concluded that the language of the abuse exclusion encompassed WHC’s vicarious liability for Vaughan’s intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from the abuse. The Court did not find any language in the abuse exclusion that limits its application to damages awarded for an insured’s direct liability, explaining: “The failure to include an express denial of coverage for claims of secondary, or vicarious, liability, does not support the interpretation advanced by WHC, i.e., that the policy must therefore cover vicarious liability. Nor does it render the exclusion ambiguous.”
The Court further held that, because the result of its decision was that no claims were covered by the insurance policies, there was no basis to conclude that Grange must indemnify WHC for the attorney fees awarded on noncovered claims, nor was Grange obligated to pay any amount of post judgment interest.
Assessment
This is an important decision that enforces the abuse exclusion that is found in many commercial policies. The Ohio Supreme Court did not disturb the Tenth District Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the exclusion unambiguously applies to physical abuse and not just sexual abuse. Importantly, the Court found that the exclusion is not ambiguous, in that it clearly excludes claims for bodily injury arising from secondary, or vicarious, liability.
Please contact your Weston Hurd attorney if you have any questions about this decision.
Ohio Supreme Court Slip Opinion
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2016/2016-Ohio-2913.pdf
Weston Hurd Insurance Update
2016 – Insurer Prevails in Church Lawsuit – May